Consumption expenditure declines around the time of retirement for many households. Some analysts argue that this is inconsistent with the behavior implied by forward-looking life-cycle models. However, most studies of saving for retirement take the timing of retirement as given, and analyze saving and consumption behavior conditional on retirement. This study builds a life cycle model in which both consumption and employment are choices. The model incorporates several key features of the budget constraint facing older households, including Social Security retirement and disability programs, a consumption floor provided by government welfare programs, stochastic earnings and asset returns processes, layoff risk, and health and mortality risk. The model is solved and calibrated to the behavior of a cohort of men, using data from the U.S. Health and Retirement Study and the Consumer Expenditure Survey. The main finding is that the model generates a drop in consumption at retirement. This is a result of making the timing of retirement a choice. Eliminating the retirement decision from the model eliminates the drop in consumption at retirement. The intertemporal substitution of leisure for consumption thus seems to be an important part of the explanation for the drop in consumption at retirement. Another important finding is that the model predicts a decline in wealth with age, while the data show an increase. Alternative parameterizations of the model that are able to match the agewealth profile predict a much smaller drop in consumption at retirement. 
Introduction
The adequacy of saving for retirement has received considerable attention in recent years.
Personal saving rates and wealth holdings in the United States exhibit large dispersion, and a significant fraction of households approach retirement with few assets other than home equity (Hurd, 1990; Federal Interagency Forum on Aging Related Statistics, 2001; Purcell, 2003) .
Many households do not have the resources needed to maintain their pre-retirement level of consumption following retirement (Hamermesh, 1984) . Consumption expenditure declines significantly following retirement for many U.S. households (Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg, 2001; Hurd and Rohwedder, 2003) . Some analysts argue that such findings are inconsistent with the behavior implied by forward-looking life-cycle models. Alternative "behavioral" models of saving, in which consumers have limited ability or willingness to plan for the future or to carry out their plans, imply that a laissez-faire approach to savings policy is inefficient (Ameriks et al., 2003; Bernheim 1994; Laibson et al., 1998; Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 1996) . Others argue that the evidence is consistent with adequate retirement savings, and that policies intended to encourage greater savings are likely to be ineffective and costly (Lazear, 1994; Engen, Gale, and Uccello, 1999; Engen, Gale, and Scholz, 1996) . This is clearly a major public policy issue in view of the rapid aging of the population.
Most studies of saving for retirement take the timing of retirement as given, and analyze saving behavior conditional on retirement. However, just as there is wide dispersion in wealth at retirement, there is also wide dispersion in the age of retirement in the U.S. If consumers exercise choice over both the timing of retirement and saving for retirement, then conditioning on one behavior in the analysis of the other possibly closely-related behavior could produce 2 misleading inferences. More generally, factors that affect saving behavior may also affect employment decisions. Such factors include preferences, the probability distribution of future income, realizations of the income process, and government programs that affect income and consumption.
Conversely, studies of the timing of retirement have focused mainly on health, Social Security, and pension incentives as explanations for empirical regularities and variation. Most empirical studies either ignore wealth as a determinant of labor force exit behavior, or treat accumulated wealth as given in the retirement decision. Empirically, wealth has little explanatory power in models of retirement timing (Blau, 1994; Blau and Gilleskie, 2001; Diamond and Hausman, 1984) . Most structural models of retirement, such as those in Berkovec and Stern (1991) , Blau and Gilleskie (2003) , Rust and Phelan (1997) , and Stock and Wise (1990) , ignore wealth as well. The fact that wealth has little explanatory power in models of labor force exit behavior might suggest that there is little gain from modeling saving and retirement jointly. However, the very substantial dispersion in wealth accumulation at retirement strongly indicates heterogeneity in motives, constraints, or both (Diamond and Hausman, 1984) .
Failure to account for such heterogeneity could make inferences from models that treat wealth as given quite misleading. French and Jones (2004) and Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2003) analyze saving and retirement behavior jointly in a structural model, but do not discuss the implications of their models for consumption following retirement. Blundell, Magnac, and Meghir (1997) present a theoretical analysis of a life cycle model of savings and labor market transitions, but do not focus on retirement.
This study builds a life cycle model in which both consumption and employment are 3 choices. The model incorporates several key features of the budget constraints facing older households: Social Security retirement and disability programs, a consumption floor provided by government welfare programs, stochastic processes for earnings and asset returns, layoff risk, health risk, and mortality risk. The model is calibrated and solved, and its implications for consumption behavior are analyzed. The basic issue examined here is whether the model can generate simulated consumption and retirement behavior that resemble the general patterns of behavior we see in the data, in particular the drop in consumption at retirement.
The main finding of the study is that the type of consumption behavior that has been characterized as inconsistent with forward-looking life cycle models is in fact consistent with the life cycle framework. The key features necessary in order for a life cycle model to generate behavior in which consumption falls at retirement are (1) uncertainty, (2) retirement is a choice, and (3) the retirement decision is discrete. A model with these features generates a drop in consumption at retirement for a wide range of parameter configurations regardless of the other features of the model, and a model in which retirement is not a choice or there is no uncertainty cannot generate such behavior, regardless of other features of the model. Intertemporal substitution of leisure for consumption thus seems to be an important part of the explanation for the drop in consumption at retirement. I speculate that the discreteness of the retirement decision may also be part of the explanation: if hours of work could be continuously adjusted, then consumption would not change as abruptly at retirement. When consumption is the only continuous choice variable, it is optimal to change consumption abruptly at retirement, given that retirement is a choice and the optimal date of retirement is inherently uncertain. Consistent with this intuition, I show that increasing the number of discrete hours-of-work options in the model 4 reduces the magnitude of the drop in consumption at retirement.
The main determinant of the magnitude of the drop in consumption at retirement in the model is the amount of wealth at retirement. All agents start with the same wealth endowment in simulations of the model, but they accumulate different amounts of wealth because they experience different sequences of realizations of the stochastic processes. Low wealth accumulation leads to a larger drop in consumption at retirement, other things equal. Simulated agents who accumulate as much wealth as the median household in the data do not experience any drop in consumption at retirement. But the great majority of simulated agents accumulate far less wealth than the median household and thus experience a large drop in consumption at retirement. Yet the data also show that the typical household does experience a sizeable drop in consumption at retirement. I examine a number of explanations for this apparent puzzle. In each case, the results indicate that alternative parameterizations of the model that can match the asset patterns observed in the data cannot match the magnitude of the drop in consumption at retirement observed in the data. Resolving this puzzle is an important topic for future research.
The next section of the paper describes the drop in consumption at retirement and discusses how previous studies attempt to explain it. The following sections describe the model and solution method; data, calibrated parameters, and model fit; and the results of simulations of behavior based on the model. The final section offers conclusions.
The Drop in Consumption at Retirement
The drop in consumption expenditure at retirement has been documented in the U.S. with the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Continuing Survey of Food Intake of 5 Individuals, the Retirement History Survey (RHS), and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
However, all of these surveys have significant limitations for analyzing consumption expenditure. Most cover only a few consumption items, typically food, utilities, and housing.
These are general purpose surveys, and the consumption data are not measured in the same careful way as in consumption surveys. In the subsequent calibration analysis, I use the HRS because it has the most complete and up-to-date data on employment, Social Security, health, and mortality of the older U.S. population. In this section, I document consumption expenditure around the time of retirement using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), which contains the highest quality consumption data available in the U.S. These data are similar to the Family Expenditure Survey data analyzed by Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) for the United Kingdom. The CEX is a short rotating panel; households are interviewed five times at three month intervals and then dropped from the survey. The first interview collects baseline information. Consumption expenditure data are recorded at the remaining interviews for each of the three calendar months preceding the month of the interview. Combining the 12 months of data for a household that responds to all surveys yields an measure of annual consumption expenditure. Data for households that responded to some but not all of the last four surveys are scaled up to provide an estimate of annual expenditure.
In the calibration analysis, I use a relatively homogeneous sample in order to avoid mixing life cycle patterns with other sources of heterogeneity. Specifically, the HRS subsample that I use consists of married, white, non-Hispanic men with exactly 12 years of education, born from 1921-1950. Here I use a subsample of the CEX drawn from the same population, and I also present some results for a broader population. I use two measures of consumption expenditure: 6 total and non-durable. And I use two measures of employment status: employed, and employed year round full time. The latter corresponds to the definition of employment used in the calibration analysis. I use a measure of employment rather than a self-reported retirement measure because the latter is reported in the CEX only for individuals who have not worked for the 12 preceding months, and in any case employment is a more objective status than retirement.
I report results derived from CEX surveys covering the period 1980-2000. The analysis in this section is descriptive, so there is no effort to account for joint determination of employment and consumption. I report results based on both cross section and cohort analysis.
The upper panel of Table 1 shows that consumption expenditure is 22 log points higher among employed men compared to non-employed men at ages 50-80 in the relatively homogenous sample. This regression controls for single year of age dummies and single year of birth dummies. Adding controls for family structure, region and urban location, and spouse characteristics reduces the difference to 18 log points, and controlling for the spouse's employment status reduces it by another two points. Comparing men employed year-round fulltime to other men yields differences that are 6-8 log points smaller. The associations between employment and non-durable consumption are very similar to those for total consumption. The results were also very similar when the analysis was limited to the typical age range of retirement of 55-65 and when 10-year birth cohorts were analyzed separately (not shown in the table). The results in the lower part of the table for a broader population from the same birth cohorts yields differences that are substantially larger, even controlling for the respondent's characteristics. In rows 2-3, the differences are 15-26 log points, compared to 10-20 log points in the upper panel. These findings are similar to those reported in most other studies, and confirm 7 that there are large differences in consumption expenditure between older households as a function of the employment status of the male household head. This does not demonstrate that consumption falls at retirement, however, because the analysis is based on a time series of cross sections in which individuals cannot be followed as they move from employment to nonemployment.
In order to examine whether consumption falls at retirement, I follow Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) by studying how average consumption expenditure of birth cohorts changes over time as their employment status changes. To do this, I use eight birth cohorts of men, in four year intervals from 1921 through 1952. Averaging log consumption and employment within each birth cohort in each year and taking first differences yields 67 observations in which the cell size is at least 100 for the eight cohorts between the ages of 51 and 72 The regression results reported in the upper panel of Table 2 control for birth cohort dummies and a linear age term.
The results show a strong association between the year-to-year change in employment status and the change in log consumption, with effects ranging from .57 to .71. Results are also reported for the more homogenous sample in the lower panel, although the underlying cell sizes are much smaller. The effects for this group are similar in magnitude.
How can the drop in consumption at retirement be explained in economic terms? A large literature on household saving behavior specifies life cycle models in which the main motive for saving is to finance consumption during retirement (see Browning and Lusardi, 1996 , for a review). In these models, risk-averse consumers prefer consumption trajectories that keep the marginal utility of consumption relatively constant over the life cycle. A large drop in annual income at the time of retirement is quite common in the U.S., so smoothing the marginal utility 8 of consumption is usually thought to require saving while employed and dis-saving during retirement. Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001) argue that strong tastes for work-related consumption and leisure substitutes could rationalize a drop in consumption at retirement and low wealth at retirement, in anticipation of lower consumption after retirement. Their empirical results for the U.S. using data from the PSID indicate that consumption falls discontinuously at retirement, with a bigger drop for households with less wealth and lower income replacement rates. However, this is true for total consumption expenditure, but not for work-related expenses and leisure substitutes. They note that a consumer who retires earlier than planned due to an unanticipated event would have lower wealth at retirement and a bigger drop in consumption at retirement than a consumer who retired at the planned date. They re-estimate their model treating the age of retirement as endogenous, using age, education, family size, gender, and marital status as instruments. They still find a strong negative correlation between retirement wealth and the magnitude of the drop in consumption around the time of "predicted" retirement. Thus, even households that "planned" to retire early fail to avoid a large drop in consumption at retirement.
Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg conclude that their evidence is inconsistent with the implications of forward-looking life cycle models, but potentially consistent with behavioral models of saving. Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) find that a significant proportion of the fall in consumption at retirement in the U.K. can be accounted for by anticipated changes in demographics and labor market status -i.e., non-separability of consumption and leisure. But an important proportion is unexplained. They argue that the only way to fully reconcile the fall in consumption around the time of retirement with the life cycle model is with the arrival of 9 unexpected adverse information at the time of retirement. For example, consumers might systematically overestimate their retirement income, and only become aware of their actual retirement income upon retiring.
Several recent papers provide further analysis of the "retirement-consumption puzzle." Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) report that a drop in consumption following retirement is anticipated by the majority of HRS households that are not yet retired, and that the expected decrease is quite close to the average decline reported by households that have already retired.
They investigate one possible explanation: substitution of home production for market goods.
Their results indicate that hours per week spent on home activities that are possible substitutes for purchased goods (cleaning, washing, shopping, preparing meals, etc.) are significantly higher for retired men compared to men of the same age who are not retired. Aguiar and Hurst (2004) find that food expenditure decreases at retirement but food consumption does not. Using data from diaries recording food eaten during a 24 hour period, they show that retired households consume almost exactly the same number of calories per day as non-retired households, other things equal, while food expenditure for retired households is about 17 percent lower than for non-retired households. They also investigate home production as an explanation, and find that retired households spend more time on home production of food than do non-retired households.
Haider and Stephens (2004) find a nine percent drop in food consumption at retirement in the U.S. Retirement History Survey (RHS) data from 1969-79. Using subjective retirement expectations as an instrument for actual retirement does not change the magnitude of the estimate. See Lundberg, Startz, and Stillman (2003) and Miniaci, Monfardini, and Weber (2003) for additional evidence.
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The model developed in this paper deliberately abstracts from most of the issues discussed in these papers. In this model, consumers are ex ante identical. They have different ex post outcomes because they experience different realizations of the stochastic processes for earnings, layoffs, job offers, asset returns, and health. In this respect, the model resembles those of Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) and Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2004) . These papers find that most American households are saving at least as much as the "optimal" amount implied by their calibrated life cycle models, given the actual earnings histories and Social Security and pension entitlements of the households in their samples. The key difference between their approach and mine is that consumers have no control over the timing of retirement in their models, while in my model employment is a decision variable. Furthermore, in the model developed here, consumption and leisure are additively separable in the period-specific utility function. Thus I do not allow for either non-separability of consumption and leisure or home production, which Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) and others argue is a large part of the explanation for the decline in consumption at retirement. The question posed here is whether a life cycle model can generate behavior like that observed in data, without resorting to heterogeneity in preferences, expectations, and constraints and without assuming nonseparability of consumption and leisure.
The Model

A. Model Specification
Time is discrete and is indexed by t, which is also referred to as age. All shocks dated period t are realized at the beginning of the period, before period t choices are made. There is a finite horizon, T, and death is certain at T+1.
Health and mortality. The probability of health changing from h t-1 =h to h t =hN at the beginning of period t is B hhNt , h = 0,1; hN = 0,1,2, where 0=good, 1=bad, and 2=dead. Health transition rates vary with age, but do not depend on other state variables.
Employment and earnings. The employment choice variable is j t , which takes on the value 1 if the agent chooses to be employed in period t and 0 if he chooses non-employment.
There is a layoff probability of 8. If the agent was employed in period t-1 and not laid off at the beginning of t, then his choice set includes employment. If he was not employed in t-1 or was laid off at the beginning of t, then he receives a job offer at the beginning of t with probability N.
With probability 1-N, there is no job offer and the only option available is non-employment.
There are no differences among jobs. The log wage offer in period t is lnw t = $ + 0 t , where 0 t is an iid mean-zero normal shock with variance F 0 2 . Wages are constant with respect to age and experience because this is what the data described below show at older ages. Annual earnings are
Social Security. The Social Security retirement (Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, or OASI) benefit is determined by the formula B t = B(AIME t , fe, j t , t), where AIME t is average indexed monthly earnings, and fe is the age at which the individual first becomes entitled to OASI. The employment choice (j) matters because there is an earnings test at some ages. Age (t) matters because there is a minimum age of eligibility, and because the earnings test is agespecific. Details are described in the Appendix. Initial entitlement is assumed to take place in the first period on or after the minimum age of eligibility (62) in which the individual chooses nonemployment. Thus entitlement is not a choice variable. Initial entitlement is a one-time irreversible choice, although the benefit can vary over time as a result of the earnings test.
The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefit for an individual who is eligible for SSDI is determined by the formula B t = D(AIME t , t), for t < min{fe, anr}, where anr is the age of normal retirement (65). Eligibility for SSDI benefits (denoted by d t = 1) is assumed to be determined as follows. An agent can become entitled to SSDI benefits only after one year spent in non-employment (the waiting period) and in bad health. Application is assumed to be costless, so everyone who is in bad health and chooses non-employment at age t (and has not yet entitled to the OASI benefit and has not yet reached the age of normal retirement) applies. At the beginning of t+1, an individual who applied for SSDI in period t is accepted to the program with probability R 1hhN , which depends on health in period t (h, which must equal 1 in order to apply) and the health realization in period t+1 (hN). An individual who was on SSDI in period t faces a termination probability at the beginning of t+1 given by R 0hhN . An individual cannot be on SSDI if he is employed, so he is automatically terminated in any period in which he chooses to be employed. The SSDI benefit formula is similar to the retirement benefit formula except that there is no benefit reduction for early entitlement to SSDI. An individual who is enrolled in SSDI upon reaching the age of normal retirement has his SSDI benefit converted to a retirement (OASI) benefit, following Social Security rules. This specification is an approximation to the complicated application, appeal, and eligibility process that characterizes the actual SSDI program.
If the individual is below the age of eligibility for early retirement and is not on SSDI, then average earnings (AIME) evolve according to the rule AIME t = (AIME t-1 *(t-1) + j t min{W t , W m })/t where W m is the maximum amount of taxable Social Security earnings. If he is between the ages of early and normal retirement, then AIME follows this rule or the rule AIME t = AIME t-1 depending on which yields the higher value. Beginning at the age of normal retirement, AIME t = AIME t-1 .
Assets and returns. The law of motion for assets is A t+1 = R t+1 , where is assets at the end of t, A t+1 is assets at the beginning of t+1, R t+1 = 1+r t+1 , and r t+1 is the rate of return on assets. R t+1 , the return factor, is determined by R t+1 = , where 2 t is an iid normal shock, 2 t N(0, F 2 2 ). Returns are defined to include capital gains, so R t <1 corresponds to a capital loss. I assume there is a liquidity constraint, $ 0, and a consumption floor . The liquidity constraint prevents agents from borrowing against uncertain future income. The consumption floor is a simple way of modeling complicated government welfare programs such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Food Stamps, and Medicaid that allow individuals with no other sources of income to survive (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995) . I assume that if cash on hand (income plus assets) at the beginning of a period is less than , then the government provides the individual with consumption of and confiscates all of the individual's cash on hand.
Other income and medical expenditure. ). An important feature of this utility function is that leisure and consumption are additively separable within periods. This separability is deliberate: the question of interest in this paper is whether a "pure" life cycle model can explain a drop in consumption at retirement, without resort to a complicated utility function. The coefficient ( h3 allows for a psychic cost of returning to work, which is a simple way of preventing excessive "churning" in employment behavior.
I also allow for the possibility of a bequest motive, specified as 6ln(max{ , }), where >0 is a minimum level of assets that agents are required to maintain.
The agent's goal is to choose j t and C t , t=1,...T, to maximize the EPDV of lifetime utility, 15 with discount factor *. The model is solved by backward recursion starting at period T, using a variation of the monte carlo simulation and regression approximation approach developed by Keane and Wolpin (1994) . The solution method is sketched in the Appendix, and a more detailed description is available from the author on request.
Several important limitations of the model should be noted. First, there are no employerprovided pensions. Second, there are no permanent shocks to earnings and asset returns. Third, there is no asset allocation decision. Fourth, the employment decision is binary. Finally, the decision to claim Social Security retirement benefits is not modeled directly. Below, I discuss the consequences of relaxing several of these restrictions.
Data and Calibration
Data from the U.S. As noted above, the HRS contains little data on consumption expenditure. Information on food expenditure was collected in several waves, and information on total expenditure was also collected in two waves. On average, food expenditure declined by 8 percent and total expenditure by 3 percent between adjacent surveys in which an individual worked and then stopped working. However, these figures are based on small numbers of observations, averaged over all ages. There are too few observations on changes in total expenditure and food expenditure associated with labor force exit to use in analysis. Therefore I use the CEX data described above to compare to the consumption patterns in the simulations.
The model was calibrated as follows. Health transition models were estimated as a function of age to characterize the health and mortality risk parameters. The HRS wage data were used to estimate the parameters of the log wage distribution. The SSDI transition parameters were chosen to roughly reproduce the incidence of SSDI observed in the data. The layoff, other income, and medical expenditure parameters were estimated from HRS data. The job offer rate and the variance of the asset return process were chosen arbitrarily.
Alternative combinations of the coefficient of relative risk aversion ("), time preference (*), and the mean rate of return were ( ) specified. The other utility function parameters (('s and F , 's) were then chosen so as to match the employment profile, employment transition profiles, and OASI entitlement profiles. This was done visually, so this process should be treated as nothing more than an "existence" proof; there is no presumption that the parameters used here are the only ones that could generate the patterns observed in the data or that they maximize the value of some objective criterion function. Table 3 shows the parameter values for a baseline case with a risk aversion coefficient of 2, a rate of time preference of 3%, and a mean rate of return of 3%.
The model solution was used to simulate life cycle trajectories for 10,000 artificial agents. Each agent begins at age 51 with given values of assets ($100,000) and AIME ($32,600), chosen to match the age-51 median (assets) and mean (AIME) in the data. Agents are randomly assigned a health status and an initial employment status to match the proportions observed in the data. They are randomly assigned a draw from the distribution of the disturbances, and they then make optimal employment and consumption choices for t=1 (age=51). The realizations of the stochastic processes together with the choices they make determine the values of the state variables at the end of the period, which are passed forward to the next period. The process repeats until period T or death.
Figures 1-12 illustrate the fit of the model to the age profiles of the HRS data. Figure 1 shows that the model fits the employment profile quite well, capturing the acceleration in the rate of non-employment around age 62 and the much slower rate of change after age 65. It is worth emphasizing that these changes in the slope of the age-employment relationship are mostly due to Social Security incentives in the model, since health status and the utility of leisure change smoothly with age. In Figure 2 , the model reproduces the general pattern of the two-year entry rate to employment: high at younger ages and then declining. The model underpredicts the early spike in entry. Figure 3 shows that the model is able to mimic the two year transition rate from employment to non-employment quite well. Figure 4 shows that the model overpredicts the rate of entitlement to OASI benefits at some ages, but does capture the general pattern of entitlement occurring predominantly at ages 62-65. In the model, anyone who is not employed at age 62 is assumed to entitle, which is clearly not the case in the data. Figure 5 shows that the model predicts receipt of SSDI benefits well. In the model SSDI receipt is zero by assumption beginning at age 65, since SSDI is converted to OASI at age 65 as required by law. In the data, SSDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) receipt are asked in the same question, so the 5% rate of receipt at age 65 in the data is presumably SSI. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate that the model does a reasonably good job of reproducing the levels of OASI and SSDI benefits conditional on receipt, with the predictions about $2-3,000 too high. Figure 8 shows that the model predicts a decline in median assets from $100,000 at 51 to around zero at 63. The data show a completely different pattern, with an increase to around $250,000 at 65 and a roughly constant level thereafter. The phenomenon of life cycle consumers depleting their assets and living on Social Security benefits was also found by Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) and is therefore not unique to a model with retirement as a choice. Below, I discuss alternative specifications that are able to match the asset data.
The model mimics wage and other income patterns by age well (Figures 9 and 10 ). Total household income is significantly underpredicted by the model (Figure 11 ), although the pattern of decline with age is captured. This is due mainly to absence of pension benefits and under predicting asset income. The model predicts the health trend quite well (Figure 12 ), and also captures the underlying health transitions patterns well (not shown).
Figures 13 and 14 compare the average consumption trajectories by employment status generated by the model with those derived from the CEX for the same cohort of men. The model underpredicts consumption when not employed by about $6-7,000 on average. It overpredicts consumption when employed by about $3,000. In both cases the model captures the declining trend in consumption with age. The sample size for individual years of age in the CEX for the narrowly defined cohort is generally quite small, and this is reflected in the relatively jagged age profiles. The CEX data were not used in the calibration exercise, so the fact that the model is able to reproduce the main features of consumption in the data provides some support for the usefulness of the model. Figure 15 shows mean consumption and net (of medical expenditure) after-tax income trajectories in the simulations, by employment status. Consumers dis-save on average while employed until age 60, reflecting the spend-down of assets shown in Figure 8 . As employment falls rapidly following age 60, the agents who remain employed tend to have high earnings, so at 20 later ages there is net saving while employed. Consumers who are not employed at younger ages dis-save substantially. This may reflect the fact that non-employment at younger ages is generally temporary and not due to permanent exit from the labor force. At older ages, consumption tracks net income very closely among the retired. There is a large gap between consumption when employed and not employed at all ages, including the typical ages of retirement. This is the retirement consumption puzzle that is supposed to be difficult to reconcile with the life cycle model, yet here such behavior is generated by a life cycle model.
Implications of the Model for the Retirement-Consumption Puzzle
In order to explore this phenomenon further, Figure 16 displays the mean change in the logarithm of consumption from one period to the next as a function of the change in employment status between the two periods. Changes in consumption associated with remaining employed or remaining non-employed from one period to the next are close to zero on average. The increase in consumption associated with labor force entry is due to the fact that most entry occurs at younger ages following a temporary non-employment spell. The most important feature of Figure 16 is that the average change in consumption associated with exit from the labor force is negative at all ages. At the typical ages of retirement in the early to mid 60s, the average drop in consumption associated with exit from employment is 20-30 log points. In order to focus exclusively on the consumption changes associated with retirement, as opposed to temporary withdrawal from employment, Figure 17 plots consumption profiles for selected employment sequences in which there is a clear date of retirement. All of the cases shown are ones in which several consecutive periods of employment are followed by several consecutive periods of nonemployment. In each case, there is a clear drop in consumption at retirement. Consumption continues to decline for several periods after retirement before leveling off.
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Why does consumption drop abruptly at retirement in this model? We can rule out a number of explanations suggested in the literature, since they are not part of the model. These include work-related expenses, non-separability of leisure and consumption, home production, lack of self control, and changes in household composition. Two changes in model specification can eliminate the drop in consumption at retirement: removing employment as a choice variable and eliminating all sources of uncertainty. If consumers are required to work until a specified age and then forced to retire, consumption does not drop abruptly at retirement. This is illustrated in Figure 18 , which shows the consumption path generated by a specification that is identical to the one that generated the other paths except that consumers are required to work in every period through age 64 and then retire at age 65. There is a small change in the slope of the consumption profile at age 65 in this case, but it is part of an ongoing trend toward lower consumption, rather than an abrupt decrease. Figure 18 also shows the consumption profile for the case of perfect certainty, which shows a much flatter trajectory than in the other cases and no drop in consumption at retirement.
This finding suggests that it is the combination of uncertainty and intertemporal substitution of leisure for consumption that generates the drop in consumption at retirement.
Forward-looking consumers recognize that retiring earlier provides more lifetime leisure, and
depending on their preferences they may be willing to sacrifice a substantial amount of consumption in exchange for additional years of leisure. In a world of certainty, one could plan for this precisely, and the entire lifetime consumption path would be lower for agents who planned to retire earlier. There would be no need for an abrupt drop in consumption. In an uncertain world in which the data of retirement is not known in advance, it may be optimal to reduce consumption abruptly upon retiring in order to conserve resources for a longer-thananticipated period of retirement.
This discussion suggests that "unexpected" or "unplanned" retirement should be associated with a larger drop in consumption than "expected" or "planned" retirement. This idea has been discussed in the literature, but without reference to a specific model the concept of "unexpected" retirement is difficult to precisely define and measure. In the model developed here, there is a natural definition and a straightforward way to measure this concept. Define E t max(work) = E t maxV 1Ct+1 (S t+1 | j t , C t , S t ) as the expected value of working in period t+1 given
period t choices and states, and E t max(nowork) = E t maxV 0Ct+1 (S t+1 | j t ,C t ,S t ) as the expected value
of not working. Note that in both cases, it is assumed that the optimal choice of C t+1 is made.
Define EG t / E t max(work) -E t max(nowork) as the expected gain in lifetime utility from working
in t+1 relative to not working. A natural interpretation is that the larger the value of EG t , the more likely it is that the agent "plans" to work in t+1, and the more "unexpected" it is if he actually does not work in t+1 given the realizations of the t+1 shocks. Since E t max(work) and E t max(nowork) are computed as part of the solution of the model, it is straightforward to examine the association between these measures and the magnitude of the drop in consumption at retirement.
I estimated a regression of the change in log consumption at the time of labor force exit on age, cash on hand (assets plus income), health changes, experience (consecutive periods of employment), lagged consumption, and EG t . To provide a flexible characterization of the effects of cash on hand and expectations, the regression uses a series of dummy variables for intervals of $5,000 for cash on hand and one log point for EG t . Cases in which employment was not an option in the second period as a result of a layoff and lack of another job offer are excluded.
Holding the other variables constant at their means, Figure 19 shows the resulting estimates of the relationship between cash on hand and the drop in consumption at retirement. The predicted drop in log consumption at the time of labor force exit is about -.35 for cash on hand of $50,000,
-.08 for cash on hand of $100,000, and zero for $200,000 in cash on hand. Thus, agents could quite easily avoid a drop in consumption, since they are endowed with $100,000 in assets in the first period. Apparently, they gain greater expected lifetime utility by spending down assets at a relatively young age and cutting consumption at the time of retirement, rather than holding on to their assets in order smooth consumption. Figure 20 shows the estimated relationship between EG t and the drop in consumption at retirement. The graph illustrates the overall negative effect of "surprises" on the drop in consumption at retirement, but also indicates that even the least surprising retirement by this metric (EG t =0) yields a drop in consumption of over 35 log points.
Thus it does not appear that "unexpected retirement" is a major part of the explanation for the drop in retirement at consumption. This is consistent with the finding of Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) that the majority of older households anticipate that consumption will decline at retirement. Table 4 summarizes the results of an extensive analysis of the robustness of the drop in consumption at retirement to alternative parameter values and model specifications. In order to focus on retirement rather than temporary exits from employment, the sample used in the analysis reported in Table 4 consists of simulated individuals who worked for at least three consecutive periods, left employment, and remained non-employed for at least three consecutive periods as of age 67. In each case, the employment preference parameters (('s, and F , ) were calibrated so that the simulated employment data matched the HRS employment data by age as 24 closely as possible. The baseline specification is the one shown in Table 3 .
The drop in consumption at retirement is robust to alternative values of the risk aversion parameter (panel 1) and the rate of time preference (panel 2). However, as shown in panel 3, the drop is much smaller when the mean (before-tax) real rate of return is increased from 3% to 6%
and 9%. With a 9% mean real rate of return, the average drop in consumption at retirement is only two log points. Figure 21 shows that in this case the model matches the asset trajectory much better than in the baseline case of a 3% mean return. A high rate of return clearly favors greater asset accumulation, and consistent with the strong effect of wealth shown in Figure 19 , results in a much smaller drop in consumption at retirement. However, a 9% mean real rate of return is far higher than the average rate of return realized during the 1992-2002 period covered by the HRS data. To measure of the rate of return during this period, I used information on stock, bond, and Certificate of Deposit returns, along with a home price index. In order to construct weights for returns on the various items, I used the portfolio composition of the HRS subsample in 1992. The mean percentage shares of home equity, stocks, bonds, CDs, checking and saving accounts, IRAs, vehicles, and other assets in total net wealth were 56.8, 4.1, 0.4, 2.8, 7.5, 8.6, 10.1, and 9.5, respectively. I assumed that IRA assets were allocated equally between stocks, bonds, and CDs; returns on checking and saving accounts and vehicles were zero; and that returns on other assets were equal to CD returns. The Appendix describes the data. After deflating by the consumer price index, this yielded a mean real rate of return of 1.9 percent.
Hence it is incorrect to attribute the observed increase in assets in the HRS sample to high returns, despite the well-known stock market surge in the late 1990s.
This leaves open the question of whether a life cycle model that matches the asset accumulation pattern in the data through some mechanism other than unrealistically high returns is capable of generating a large drop in consumption at retirement. Three other mechanisms are investigated here. The first is a bequest motive. Panel 4 of Table 4 reports the results of a simulation in which a bequest motive is operative, with the bequest parameter (6) calibrated to match the asset data and the other utility function parameters calibrated to match the employment data. The results show a drop in consumption at retirement of only four log points. Figure 22 shows that this specification provides a good fit to the asset data through the late 60s.
The second mechanism is to eliminate Social Security from the model. This might be rationalized as an extreme case of allowing agents to have a probability distribution over future Social Security benefits rather than assuming that they expect benefits promised under current rules with certainty, an idea investigated in a less extreme form by Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2003) . Forcing people to save for their retirement does in fact result in much higher asset accumulation, as illustrated in Figure 23 . The resulting average drop in consumption at retirement shown in panel 5 of Table 4 is 10 log points, versus 28 log points in the baseline case.
Finally, I allow for the possibility that housing wealth is regarded by consumers as off limits for the purpose of financing consumption. I use the bequest parameter to match the distribution of non-housing wealth shown in Figure 24 . On average, median non-housing wealth is only about half of total wealth, so a smaller bequest parameter provides a reasonably good fit to the data, as shown in the figure. The drop in consumption at retirement in this case is -.05, shown in Table 4 ,
These results suggest that any mechanism that allows the model to match the increasing trend in assets with age will result in a much smaller drop in consumption at retirement than in 26 the case in which assets fall to zero at a relatively young age. This appears to pose a puzzle for the life cycle model. The model can explain a drop in consumption at retirement or an increase in assets with age but not both. Yet we see both in the data. Resolution of the puzzle will require further analysis. I am not confident that the mechanisms used here to account for high and rising assets -high returns, a bequest motive, and absence of Social Security -are plausible explanations for the asset patterns in the data. But I do not have a better alternative to suggest, particularly one that could also account for the large observed drop in consumption at retirement.
Several other extensions to the analysis are briefly described here. First, I extended the model to allow both full time and part time employment. This makes the employment choice less lumpy and provides agents with another mechanism for adjusting to shocks. I calibrated this version of the model to the HRS data on full time and par time employment. Panel 7 of Table 4 shows that the drop in consumption following movements from either full time or part time employment to retirement is about -.15. This is substantially smaller than in the baseline case, confirming the intuition that the lumpiness of the employment choice is an important factor driving the drop in consumption at retirement. Second, Figure 11 showed a substantial gap between total income in the data and the simulations. In order to determine whether this affects the results, I arbitrarily added an additional $20,000 to other income at each age. The resulting calibration matched total income closely, and yielded a drop in consumption at retirement of -.20 on average (Table 4 , panel 8). Thus the main finding is robust to this change. Third, I added more dynamics to the model by incorporating permanent shocks in the form of random walks to earnings and asset returns. I was unable to achieve a satisfactory fit to the employment patterns in this case, most likely as a result of the unbounded nature of the earnings and asset returns 27 processes. Nevertheless, the results did show substantial drops in consumption at retirement.
Finally, about 60 percent of the HRS subsample analyzed here reported being covered by an employer-provided pension plan. I added a defined benefit pension plan to the model, with benefit parameters typical of those found in actual plans. However, this adds another choice variable to the model -when to leave the pension-providing firm -and several additional state variables: earnings in the last few years of employment at the pension-providing firm. This greatly complicated the model solution, and I was unable to obtain a satisfactory fit to the employment data in this case. Furthermore, the wide variety of pension plan parameters observed in the HRS plus the fact that many pensions are of the defined contribution type rather than defined benefit, made it very difficult to match the observed rates of benefit receipt and benefit levels.
Conclusions
The results in this paper show that a large drop in consumption at retirement is not a puzzle for the life cycle model. Given the lumpiness of employment behavior at older ages, it is not surprising that consumption behavior is discontinuous at the time of a change in employment. The life cycle model provides agents with the opportunity to smooth consumption, but does not guarantee that it will always be optimal to do so. Reasoning about saving for retirement based on models in which retirement is exogenous or perfectly foreseen gives quite misleading intuition. However, the results reveal another apparent puzzle: a reasonably parameterized model is unable to explain the level of assets observed in the data. Adding some fairly ad hoc mechanisms such as a bequest motive and absence of Social Security allows the 28 model to match the asset data, but the model then predicts a drop in consumption at retirement that is much smaller than the observed drop. An important task for future research is to find a plausible explanation for the asset build up observed in the data, and to reconcile the asset build up with the drop in consumption at retirement. Finally, estimation of the parameters will be the most important test of whether the life cycle model provides a useful approach to understanding consumption and saving behavior at older ages.
Appendix
Social Security retirement (OASI)
The formula for computing the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) from Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME, measured in dollars per month) in 1992 was: PIA = .9*AIME if AIME # $387 PIA = .9*387 + .32(AIME -387) if $387 < AIME # $2,333 PIA = .9*387 + .32(2,333 -387) + .15(AIME -2,333) if $2,333 < AIME 
Solution Method
The value function in period t is the Expected present Discounted Value (EPDV) of remaining lifetime utility from entering period t with state variables S t , realizing a vector of shocks , t , and making optimal choices from t through the end of life:
and V jCt+1 (S t+1 | j t , C t , S t ) is the choice-specific value function in t+1. The value function if alive in period T is V T (S T ) = maxV hjT (S T ), where computed by monte carlo integration over the distribution of the period T disturbances, for a random sample of points in the T-1 state space. The sample is generated by discretizing the continuous state variables into grids, and randomly sampling points in the discretized state space.
The optimal value of consumption for each possible choice of employment in T-1 must also be determined. This is done by an iterative grid search over consumption with a successively finer grid at each iteration until a convergence criterion is satisfied. The Emax is then used as the dependent variable in a regression on the T-1 state variables. By using a flexible form for the regression function, the R 2 is typically greater than .990.
In period T-1, the regression function is used to approximate the E T-1 MaxV hjT for each trial value of consumption and employment in T-1, integrating over the distribution of the T-1 disturbances. This is repeated recursively back to period 1. In the solution, T=50, and t=1 corresponds to age 51. In the results presented here, 50 draws from the error distribution were used in monte carlo integration, a grid of size 25 was used for discretizing assets, and a grid of size 10 was used for discretizing AIME. Note: The health transition probability B ij is estimated as exp{B hhN0 + B hhN1 t}/3exp{B hhO0 +B hhO1 t}, where B ij0 is an intercept, B ij1 is an age slope, i = 0,1; j = 0,1,2; and the parameters for 0 to 0 and 1 to 1 are normalized to 0. The disturbance correlations are all equal to zero. Notes: The baseline specification is coefficient of relative risk aversion = 2, rate of time preference = 3%, mean real after-tax rate of return = 3%, no bequest motive, no additional nonwage income, and yes Social Security. Additional nonwage income adds $20,000 per year to nonwage income. The sample consists of simulated individuals who worked for at least three consecutive periods, left employment, and remained non-employed for at least three consecutive periods as of age 67. In each case, the employment preference parameters (('s, and F , ) were calibrated so that the simulated employment data matched the HRS employment data by age as closely as possible. (mean) cons1111100 (mean) cons1111000 (mean) cons1110000 (mean) cons1100000 (mean) cons1000000 
